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Abstract: 
The paper investigates the relationship between pro-social norms and its 
implications for improved environmental outcomes, an area which has been 
neglected in the environmental economics literature. We provide empirical 
evidence, demonstrating a strong link between perceived environmental 
cooperation (reduced public littering) and increased voluntary environmental 
morale, using European Values Survey (EVS) data for 30 Western and Eastern 
European countries. The robust results suggest that environmental morale and 
perceived environmental cooperation, as well as identifying the factors that 
strengthen these relationships, potentially bring about better environmental 
outcomes.  
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In recent times, a growing number of studies have been devoted to examining 
individual environmental preferences. Initial interest in environmental attitudes 
goes back to the early 1970s (Bord and O’Connor, 1997). An increasing number of 
economists have been involved in evaluating whether an individual’s environmental 
morale or attitudes could help to reduce environmental degradation or the 
problems of free riding associated with public goods (Frey and Stutzer, 2006). One 
possible solution is to ‘force’ people to cooperate. This is in line with deterrence 
policy based on the economics-of-crime approach. Expected utility is maximized, 
taking into account the probability of detection and the degree of punishment. 
However, empirical and experimental findings indicate that deterrence models 
predict too little compliance. People are more compliant than these models predict. 
The level of compliance observed cannot be explained by the amount of risk 
aversion involved. The literature suggests that social norms help us to explain the 
high degree of compliance (Torgler, 2007). The high level of individual co-operation 
has been documented in the experimental literature. According to Ochs and Roth 
(1989) and Roth (1995), a large number of ultimatum experiments have shown 
that the modal offer is (50,50), that the mean offer is somewhere around (40,60), 
and that the smaller the offer, the higher the probability that the offer will be 
rejected. According to Ledyard (1995) and Davis and Holt (1993), public good 
experiments indicate that, on average, subjects contribute between 40 and 60 
percent of their endowment to a public good.  
 Prevailing social norms thus tend to generate increased individual 
cooperation in public good situations and, in some instances, of private goods as 
well. Violation of social norms has negative consequences, such as internal  
 
 
sanctions (e.g. guilt, remorse) or external legal and social sanctions, such as gossip 
and ostracism. As Polinsky and Shavell (2000) point out, the corresponding 
literature focuses on the influence that social norms  have on individual behavior, 
and their role as a substitute for, or a supplement to, formal laws. Laws themselves 
can influence social norms. Rege and Telle (2001) suggest that social norms may 
explain why many individuals don’t litter public places. If littering is not acceptable 
in a society, a “person throwing his ice-cream-paper on the street will feel social 
disapproval from people observing him… many people do not litter even if they 
know that nobody is observing them, because littering imposes a feeling of guilt” 
(p. 3). Feelings of guilt or shame restrict behavior. 
Many traditional models have treated public cooperation as an isolated case. 
However, subjects do not normally act as isolated individuals playing a game 
against nature. This paper emphasizes the relevance of social context in 
understanding the willingness of individuals to keep the environment clean. The 
behavior of other citizens is important to understand why people comply. As a 
consequence, theories of pro-social behaviour, which take the impact of behaviour 
or the preferences of others into account, are promising. The concept of pro-social 
behaviour is widely implemented into daily life. For example, Vesterlund (2003) 
reports that charitable organizations have an incentive to ask donors who make 
large contributions to permit the use of their name when a donation is made. Such 
an announcement is likely to have a positive effect on others who have not yet 
made a contribution. It also helps to reduce the problem of free-riding and 
encourages individuals to make larger contributions.  
Individuals may be willing to contribute conditionally, depending on the pro-
social behaviour of others. This applies to an individual’s environmental actions as  
 
 
well. The more others are perceived to comply, the more willing individuals are to 
protect the environment. We hypothesize that the extent to which others contribute 
triggers more or less cooperation and systematically influences the willingness to 
participate in environmental actions or contributions. We use survey data to test 
whether conditional cooperation can be identified for environmental actions as well.  
To our knowledge, our paper provides findings not yet discussed in previous 
environmental research. There is no study that investigates whether conditional 
cooperation is relevant in the environmental economics literature. It remains 
uncertain whether previous results in laboratory experiments or field experiments 
are directly transferable in a context that deals with environmental aspects. The 
paper also complements previous studies by providing evidence outside of a lab 
setting, using a wide-ranging survey that covers 30 Western and Eastern European 
countries.  
Section 2 provides a brief overview of the existing literature on social 
comparisons. In Section 3, we present our theoretical approach and develop our 
hypotheses. Section 4 presents the empirical results. In Section 5, we discuss the 
potential causality problems and Section 6 concludes with a summary and 
discussion of the main results.  
 
2. Overview of the literature  
Several theories have been put forward to explain what constitutes conditional 
cooperation. Most papers in the literature (cf. Rabin, 1998 and Falk and Fehr, 2002) 
explain conditional cooperation in terms of reciprocity. In an environmental context, 
reciprocity means, for example, that if many citizens don’t throw litter in a public 
place, other individuals would feel obliged to do likewise. Several laboratory  
 
 
experimental studies (mainly public good experiments) provide evidence on pro-
social behavior (for an overview, see Gächter, 2006). For example, Fischbacher, 
Gächter and Fehr (2001) find that 50 percent of the subjects were conditionally 
cooperative. Falk, Fischbacher and Gächter (2003) create a laboratory situation in 
which each subject is a member of two economically identical groups, where only 
the group members are different. They observe that the same subjects contribute 
different amounts, depending on the behavior of the group. Contributions are larger 
when group cooperation is higher. 
Alternatively, the concept of conformity (cf. Henrich, 2004) has been used to 
explain conditional cooperation. Conformity refers to the motivation of individuals 
to fulfill the social norms of keeping the environment clean and therefore acting 
according to society’s rules. This concept is less connected to incentives and 
benefits than is reciprocity. In this case, individuals would contribute, even if the 
good in question does not benefit anyone, as long as it is perceived that a sufficient 
number of individuals are contributing (Bardsley and Sausgruber, 2006).   
While several early studies provide evidence of conditional cooperation within 
a laboratory setting, an increasing number of studies have been conducted to check 
the validity of such studies outside of a laboratory setting. Frey and Meier (2004a) 
provide field experimental evidence of conditional cooperation. They analyse 
students’ decisions regarding contributions to two social funds administered by the 
University of Zurich. Their study shows that, when more individuals expect others 
to cooperate, they are more willing to cooperate. In another study, Frey and Meier 
(2004b) observe that the strongest reaction to information about others’ behaviour 
is observed in students who are uncertain whether or not to contribute to two 
Public Funds at their University. Heldt (2005) conducts a natural field experiment  
 
 
on conditional cooperation, in which cross-country skiers in two Swedish ski resorts 
are faced with the decision of whether or not to contribute to ski track funding. The 
results suggest that the percentage of subjects making a contribution is higher 
when they know that a higher percentage of individuals are making a contribution. 
Shang and Croson (2005) conducted a field experiment at an anonymous public 
radio station during an on-air fundraising campaign to investigate the influence of 
social information on the size of an individual’s contribution. The results indicate 
that social information does indeed influence contributions. Martin and Randal 
(2005) conducted another natural field experiment at an art gallery. Admission was 
free, but a donation could be placed in a transparent box in the foyer. The results 
showed that visitors donate significantly more when there is already some money in 
the box. 
The study of pro-social behaviour resulting from perceived public cooperation 
is an area that has largely been ignored in the environmental economics literature, 
despite its potential to affect environmental outcomes. The connection between 
perceived environmental cooperation of other individuals and environmental morale 
or preferences has not yet been studied in the environmental economics literature. 
In contrast, studies linking improved environmental behaviour or higher willingness 
to pay for environmental preservation with education, knowledge, environmental 
awareness and prior experience are well established in the environmental 
economics literature (cf. Tisdell and Wilson, 2001). This may be explained by the 
unavailability of quality survey data, although the concept itself may not be new to 
researchers in environmental economics. For the first time, the European Value 
Survey (EVS) provides quality survey data, asking the relevant questions to enable 
this study to be undertaken.  
 
 
Pro-social behaviour occurs voluntarily. Such behaviour is not only linked with 
public goods but also with particular private goods. The crucial feature here is that 
an individual acts according to the way the majority of the public is acting, and not 
because he or she benefits directly from such action. Hence, any strategies to 
increase pro-social behaviour have the potential to improve environmental and 
social outcomes in a cost effective manner.  
In everyday life, there are many environmental outcomes that can be 
improved through enhanced pro-social actions. We demonstrate the relationship 
between an individual’s perceptions of the public not throwing away litter in public 
places and an increase in the individual’s willingness to also protect the 
environment. Other areas where such behaviour is useful are, for example, 
conserving energy and water, contributing to environmental conservation, reducing 
car pollution and other forms of pollution, engaging in wildlife friendly gardening, 
becoming members of environmental organizations and taking part in working 
bees. In fact, the number of environmental activities that can benefit from pro-
social behaviour is endless. 
This study looks at the disposal of litter to examine whether individual 
behaviour is influenced by their perception of how other people behave. Despite 
litter in public places being recognized as a major public health and safety hazard 
and diminishing the aesthetic appearance of public places (cf. Ackerman, 1997), 
few studies have focused on dealing with this issue. Litter and unkempt lawns have 
also been linked with crime (cf. Brown et al., 2004). Existing studies examine the 
role that education can play in reducing public litter (cf. Taylor et al., 2007), and 
the instruments (e.g. taxes, fines, charges and market incentives) that can be used 




Ackerman, 1997; Dobbs, 1991). One study (Kinnaman and Fullerton, 1994), 
dealing with garbage recycling, examines why some households participate in curb 
side recycling programs, even in the absence of a user fee; why other households 
do not participate, even in the presence of a user fee; and why some households 
choose to litter while others do not. However, that paper deals with user fees and 
does not address the issue of conditional cooperation in littering behaviour. 
3 3 3. . .     E E Em m mp p pi i ir r ri i ic c ca a al l l     a ap p pp p pr r ro o oa a ac c ch h h        
3.1 Data set 
In contrast to experimental studies, this paper uses survey data provided by the 
European Values Survey (EVS) 1999/2000, which is a European-wide investigation 
of socio-cultural and political change. The survey collects data on the basic values 
and beliefs of people throughout Europe. The EVS was first carried out from 1981 to 
1983, then in 1990 to 1991 and again in 1999 through 2001, with an increasing 
number of countries participating over time. The methodological approach is 
explained in detail in the European Values Survey (1999) source book, which 
provides information on response rates, the stages of sampling procedures, the 
translation of the questionnaire, and field work, along with measures of coding 
reliability, reliability of data, and data checks. All country surveys are conducted by 
experienced professional survey organizations, with the exception of Greece. 
Interviews are face-to-face and those interviewed are adult citizens aged 18 years 
and older. Tilburg University coordinates the project and provides the guidelines to 
guarantee the use of standardized information in the surveys and the national 
representativeness of the data. To avoid framing biases, the questions are asked in  
 
 
a prescribed order. The response rates vary from country to country.  However, the 
average response rate is around 60 percent.  
Because EVS asks an identical set of questions in various European countries, 
the survey provides a unique opportunity to examine the impact of conditional 
cooperation on environmental morale and preferences. This paper considers 30 
representative national samples of at least 1,000 individuals in each country. The 
survey permits us to work with a representative set of individuals, covering a large 
set of countries. The data allows us to complement previous laboratory and field 
experiments with survey studies to demonstrate the existence of conditional 
cooperation. 
  
3.2 Dependent variables and conditional cooperation 
 
To check the robustness of results, we use two dependent variables. The first 
measures an individual’s willingness to keep public places free from litter. This 
variable is identified as (a particular case of) environmental morale. To assess the 
level of environmental morale, we use the following question:  
   
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it is 
always justified, never justified, or somewhere in between: … Throwing away 
litter in a public place.  
 
A ten-scale index is used for this question, with the two extremes being ‘never 
justified’ and ‘always justified’. The natural cut-off point is the value 1, where a 
high amount of respondents assert that throwing away litter in a public place is  
 
 
                                                    
‘never justified’ (68.3 percent). Thus, our environmental morale variable takes the 
value 1 if the respondent says that throwing away litter in a public place is ‘never 
justified’, and zero otherwise.  
The second variable is an index on environmental preferences, covering the 
following two survey questions: 
I would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be 
used to prevent environmental pollution (0=strongly disagree, 3=strongly 
agree) 
 
I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent 
environmental pollution (0=strongly disagree, 3=strongly agree) 
 
The index adds the values of both questions, which gives total values between 0 
and 6.  
In general, the EVS has been designed as a wide-ranging survey, where the 
danger of framing effects is reduced compared too many other surveys that focus 
entirely on environmental questions. The available data are based on self-reports, 
so that subjects may tend to overstate their degree of cooperation. However, the 
questions are not free of problems. The level of improvement in environmental 
quality is not clearly stated. Hence, people do not know exactly how much they 
have to pay for a particular improvement
1. The consequences of taxation are not 
mentioned either (first question). No information is provided as to how much the 
income or value added taxes, or other taxes, are supposed to be increased. It is 
thus unclear who will have to bear the highest tax burden. While unspecified 
payment schemes increase the variance, they may influence the willingness to 
 
1 It has been shown that the preferences to protect the environment (regarding causes and consequences of 
environmental damages) depend on the level of information included in the questionnaire (Bulte et al., 2005).  
 
 
                                                    
contribute (Witzke and Urfei, 2001). However, an unspecified statement still helps 
in measuring environmental preferences and the value attributed to reduce 
strategic behaviour by influencing the quantity or quality of environmental goods. 
People may intentionally indicate a false willingness to contribute in order to match 
their own preferences (Hidano et al., 2005). When neither specific goods nor 
quantitative values are used, the attributes of the environmental goods in question 
need not be thoroughly explained to ensure that respondents understand and 
respond by stating their willingness to accept an increase in taxes or to give away 
part of their income
2.  
We use the following question as an independent variable to investigate the 
impact of conditional cooperation. 
 “According to you, how many of your compatriots do the following: Throwing 
away litter in a public place?” (4=almost all, 1=almost none) 
In general, we observe an increased interest among economists to use survey data. 
For example, research that deals with social capital, corruption, happiness and tax 
compliance explore the causes of attitudes using other attitudinal variables as 
independent factors (cf. Diener and Suh, 2000; Brewer and Steenbergen, 2002; 
Uslaner, 2004; Brewer et al., 2004; and Chang and Chu, 2006 and Torgler, 2007). 
In this paper, we investigate the correlation between perceived compliance and 
environmental morale or attitudes in a multivariate analysis controlling for other 
factors in order to better isolate the relationship. A specification based on 
multivariate analysis has the obvious advantage of presenting a more balanced 
view of the role of conditional cooperation by separating the effects of other 
exogenous variables. However, if conditional cooperation differs systematically in 
 




                                                    
some other way that also affects the willingness to cooperate, the results could be 
misleading.  
4 4 4. . .     E E Ec c co o on n no o om m me e et t tr r ri i ic c c     r r re e es s su ul l lt t ts s s     
Our multivariate analysis includes a vector of control variables. Previous research in 
environmental economics and social norms demonstrates the relevance to consider 
socio-demographic and socio-economic variables along with the level of church 
attendance, formal and informal education and participation in an environmental 
organization (cf. Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas, 2007; Torgler, 2007).  In addition, a 
further variable is used to identify a potential conditional cooperative effect, namely 
individuals’ interest in others
3. The question measures how individuals experience 
their environment. We differentiate between two different regions of Europe (i.e. 
Western and Eastern Europe) because of the reform process in the transition 
countries. The rapid collapse of institutional structures in Eastern European 
countries produced a vacuum in many, if not all, of these countries. This led to 
large social costs, especially in terms of worsening income inequalities, increasing 
poverty and poor institutional conditions resulting from uncertainty and high 
transaction costs. Torgler (2003) and Alm et al. (2006) show that such 
circumstances have an impact on social norms.  
Table 1 presents the first results of the multivariate analysis. In these first 
estimates, we exclude income. This is because the ten-point income scale in the 
EVS is based on national currencies, which reduces the possibility of comparing 
nations in a cross-country comparison.
4 The self-classification of the respondents’ 
 
3 Question: People should stick to their own affairs and not show too much interest in what others say or do 
(1=agree strongly, 5=disagree strongly).  
4 Moreover, income is coded on a scale from 1 to 10 and these income intervals are not fully comparable across 
countries.   
 
 
                                                    
economic situation into various economic classes may be used as a proxy. 
However, data for this purpose has not been collected in all countries. Thus, we 
include economic status sequentially in the specification (see Table 2). In general, a 
probit estimation is appropriate when working with our first dependent variable 
(ENVIRONMENTAL MORALE) and an ordered probit model when using our INDEX OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES to take into account the ranking information of the 
scaled dependent variables. To measure the quantitative effect of this variable, we 
calculate the marginal effects, because the equation is nonlinear. Marginal effects 
indicate the change in the probability of individuals having a specific level of 
environmental morale/preferences when the independent variable increases by one 
unit. For simplicity, the marginal effects in all the estimations are presented for the 
highest value only. In addition, we present ordinary least squares estimations for 
our second dependent variable, providing beta or standardized regression 
coefficients to indicate the relative importance of conditional cooperation compared 
to the other variables used. Weighted estimates are conducted to make the 
samples correspond to the national distribution.
5 Furthermore, answers such as 
‘don’t know’ and missing values are eliminated in all estimations. 
Consistent with our main hypothesis, the estimation results in Table 1 
indicate that the lower the perceived environmental cooperation of other persons 
(higher values of the variable), the lower the environmental morale. In all three 
regressions, the coefficient PERCEIVED ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION is 
statistically significant. Overall, the size of the effect is substantial in the first 
regression; if the perceived lack of cooperation rises by one unit, the percentage of 
persons reporting highest environmental morale falls by 2.3 percentage points 
 
5 The weighting variable is provided by the EVS.   
 
 
                                                    
(specification 1). Not surprisingly, the quantitative effects are lower, but still visible, 
when using the index of environmental preferences. The index measures the 
multidimensional aspect of environmental pollution. As Table 2 indicates, the 
results remain robust when including the proxies for individuals’ economic situation.  
Looking at the other variables, we observe that being active in an 
environmental organization has a positive effect on both dependent variables, with 
marginal effects between 4.0 and 9.3 percentage points. Moreover, being 
interested in others is also positively correlated with environmental morale and 
preferences. Consistent results can also be found for CHURCH ATTENDANCE
6. In all 
cases, the coefficient is positively correlated with our dependent variables. This 
supports the argument that churches can act as social norm enforcers (cf. Torgler 
2006).  
The results obtained using the variable INDEX ENVIRONMENTAL 
PREFERENCES is consistent with the literature on environmental attitudes and 
preferences. Several studies stress that age is negatively correlated with the 
willingness to contribute to additional environmental protection, since older people 
are unlikely to enjoy the long-term benefits of preserving resources (Whitehead, 
1991; Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2000). Our results also indicate a 
negative correlation between age and environmental preferences. The reference 
group (AGE below 30 years) has the strongest environmental preferences and the 
marginal effects increase consistently for higher age groups.  
In a meta-study, Zelezny et al. (2000) find strong evidence that 
environmentalism does not begin in adulthood, which contradicts the statement, 
 
6 Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, how often do you attend religious services these days? More 
than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, less often, practically 




                                                    
which gender differences arise due to motherhood and child protection. Regardless 
of age, women show more concern for the environment than men. In our analysis, 
we observe strong gender differences. Being a woman rather than a man increases 
the probability of reporting the highest environmental preferences by 0.6 
percentage points (see Table 1). The beta coefficients indicate a strong quantitative 
effect relative to other variables.  
Regarding educational issues, the literature shows that formal education
7 has 
a significant positive influence on environmental willingness to contribute 
(Blomquist and Whitehead, 1998; Engel and Pötschke, 1998; Witzke and Urfei, 
2001; Veisten et al., 2004). On the other hand, informal education is also important 
(Whitehead, 1991; Blomquist and Whitehead, 1998; Carlsson and Johansson-
Stenman, 2000; Hidano et al., 2005). Well-informed citizens are more aware of 
environmental issues and problems and have stronger environmental attitudes, 
because they are more knowledgeable about the possible damage (Danielson et al., 
1995; Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas, 2007). The strength of formal and informal 
education is also visible in Tables 1 and 2
8. All respective coefficients are 
statistically significant and show considerable quantitative effects.  
The economic situation of an individual is also a significant aspect 
(Whitehead, 1991; Stevens et al., 1994; Blomquist and Whitehead, 1998; Popp, 
2001; Witzke and Urfei, 2001; Bulte et al., 2005; Dupont, 2004; Veisten et al., 
2004; Hidano et al., 2005). These studies show a positive relationship between 
income and a preference to contribute to environmental causes. Our study also 
points to a positive relationship between lower income classes and lower 
 
7 Formal education is usually expressed as the level of education or degrees a person has obtained. It can 
alternatively be expressed as the number of years spent in education (Blomquist and Whitehead, 1998).  
8 Formal education: At what age did you complete or will you complete your full time education, either at school 
or at an institution of higher education? Please exclude apprenticeships. Informal education/political discussion:  
When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or 
never (3=frequently, 2=occasionally, 1=never)?   
 
 
environmental values. However, the marginal effects for the variables UPPER 
CLASS and MIDDLE CLASS are similar.  
In line with Veisten et al. (2004), unemployed people are found to have lower 
preferences for environmental protection. Finally, marital status might influence 
environmental attitudes as well. It can be argued that married people are more 
compliant or more concerned about environmental degradation than others, 
especially compared to singles. They are more constrained by their social network 
and are often strongly involved with the community (Tittle, 1980). This argument 
also holds true when focusing on moral attitudes or, in our case, environmental 
morale. Overall, the estimates indicate a tendency for married individuals to have 
relatively high environmental preferences and high levels of environmental morale, 
although the differences are not always statistically significant.  
In general, the results on environmental morale are in line with the literature 
on social norms or morality, such as tax morale (cf. Torgler, 2007). Age is 
positively correlated with environmental morale and the economic situation is 
negatively correlated. Consistent with the literature on environmental preferences, 
a gender effect is observable. Education is statistically significant in Table 1. 
However, once the economic situation of the individual is controlled for, the 
coefficient is insignificant.  
In sum, the first two tables provide evidence to demonstrate the existence of 
individual conditional cooperation in relation to environmental issues.  
5. Causality 
Causality remains an issue, because one’s own attitudes may lead to the 
expectation that others behave in the same way. However, results from ‘strategy 
method’ experiments conducted by Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and  
 
 
                                                    
Gächter (2006) suggest that causality goes from beliefs about others’ cheating to 
one’s own behavior rather than vice versa. The EVS is not a panel survey. A survey 
that follows individuals over time would help us to study the dynamics of 
adjustment more deeply. The question referring to conditional cooperation was only 
asked in the last EVS of 1999 through 2001. Longitudinal data would help us to 
reduce problems caused by unobserved individual heterogeneity. In this section, we 
present two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations for both dependent variables in 
order to deal with the causality problem. We try to filter out a possible systematic 
bias in our conditional cooperative behavior by correcting for differences between 
what an individual thinks and what that individual projects on others. This provides 
the possibility of minimizing potential bias.  
Table 3 reports the results of two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations 
together with the first stage regressions. The instruments used are individuals’ 
interest in friends
9, an index of perceived honesty
10 and a dummy variable that 
measures whether an individual has or had children. Table 3 shows that the 
instruments and the F-tests for the instrument exclusion set in the first-stage 
regression are statistically significant. Consistent with our main hypothesis, the 
estimation results indicate that the lower the perceived environmental cooperation 
of other persons, the lower the environmental morale and environmental 
preferences. 
Table 4 uses yet another approach to deal with a potential endogeneity 
problem. It filters out a possible bias in the conditional cooperative effort. A 
causality problem may arise because an individual’s willingness to cooperate or 
 
9 Please say how important each of the following is in your life… friends and acquaintances (4=very important, 
1=not at all).  
10  Index covering the sum of the following questions: According to you (on a scale from 1 to 4), how many of 
your compatriots: (1) Pay cash for services to avoid taxes? (2) Go over the speed limit in built-up areas?   
 
 
                                                    
protect the environment (high environmental morale or preferences) could lead to 
the expectation that others would also behave in the same way. Thus, individuals 
with a higher environmental morale or preferences have a lower perception of 
others not cooperating or contributing. To deal with this possibility, the first step is 
to calculate the average perceived environmental cooperation for each country. The 
next step is to calculate the average perceived environmental cooperation in each 
country for individuals having the highest environmental morale
11 or environmental 
preferences. In a further step, the difference between the two average values is 
considered. These values may measure a particular bias in perceived environmental 
cooperation due to the level of environmental morale or preferences. This bias is 
then added to the individual values of the group with the highest environmental 
morale and preferences. As a consequence, the values between the group with 
higher and lower environmental morale and preferences are brought closer to 
together, depending on the perceived environmental cooperation in each country. 
This procedure may help to better isolate the existence of a conditional cooperative 
effect. Table 4 presents the results for the filtered perceived environmental 
cooperation variable. The results remain robust. Only in specification (10) do we 
observe that the z-value is below the 10 percent level. However, once the economic 
situation of the individual is included in the specification, the coefficient remains 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level and similar marginal effects are 
obtained.  
6. Conclusions  
This paper investigates whether perceived environmental cooperation by the public 
is an important determinant of explaining environmental morale and environmental 
 
11 Value 1, stressing that throwing away litter in a public place is never justifiable.  
 
 
preferences of individuals. Our hypothesis is that an individual’s behavior is likely to 
be influenced by their perception of the behavior of other citizens. For example, if 
an individual believes that throwing litter in a public place is common, then the 
environmental morale or preference of the individual decreases. Alternatively, if an 
individual believes others to be compliant, then the environmental 
morale/preference increases. Using recent EVS data for Western and Eastern 
European countries, we find strong empirical support for the hypothesis. The results 
remain robust using 11 different specifications and after dealing with potential 
causality issues.  
By investigating the public’s littering and environmental preferences, the 
paper underlines the importance of using a rich set of theories to fully understand 
what influences people’s willingness to contribute towards improving outcomes. 
Individuals indeed do not act in isolation.  
To our knowledge, this is the first study of this nature demonstrating the 
relationship between perceived environmental cooperation of others and the 
environmental morale in the form of not littering public places and willingness to 
protect the environment. This relationship can be used to bring about positive 
environmental outcomes in other areas. The interesting and attractive feature of 
this behaviour is its voluntary nature. Such behaviour is not only cost effective but 
can be more effective in areas where law enforcement and market incentives fail. 
The results of the study have implications for both developed and developing 
countries. In developing countries, for example, there is a major problem with litter 
in public places. City councils spend large sums of money to clean up litter. Heavy 
fines and strict law enforcement have been tried to discourage littering, without  
 
 
much success. Hence, the results of this study should be useful for decision-makers 
as well. 
Understanding what shapes environmental morale and preferences needs to 
be investigated further. Only a limited number of studies have explored the 
relevance of social interactions. A good understanding of the interactions between 
environmental morale and preferences and perceived environmental cooperation, 
and the factors strengthening these relationships, has the potential to bring about 




Ackerman, F., 1997. Why do we recycle? Markets, values, and public policy, Island 
Press Washington, D.C.: pp. xii, 210. 
Alm, J., Martinez-Vazquez, J. and Torgler, B., 2006. Russian Attitudes Toward 
Paying Taxes – Before, During, and After the Transition. International Journal 
of Social Economics, 33: 832-857.  
Bardsley, N., Sausgruber, R., 2005. Conformism and reciprocity in public good 
provision. Journal of Economic Psychology, 26: 664-681.  
Blomquist, G.C. and Whitehead, J.C., 1998. Resource quality information and 
validity of willingness to pay in contingent valuation. Resource and Energy 
Economics, 20: 179-196. 
Bord, R.J. and O’Connor, R.E., 1997. The gender gap in environmental attitudes: 




Brewer, Paul R., Steenbergen, M.R. and Marco, R., 2002. All against all: How beliefs 
about human nature shape foreign policy opinions. Political Psychology 23: 
39-58.  
Brewer, Paul R., Gross, Kimerly, Aday, Sean and Willnat, Lars, 2004. International 
trust and public opinion about world affairs. American Journal of Political 
Science 48: 93-109.  
Brown, B., Perkins, D. and Brown, G., 2004. Crime, New Housing, and Housing 
Incivilities in a First-Ring Suburb: Multilevel Relationships across Time. 
Housing Policy Debate 15: 301-345. 
Bulte, E., Gerking, S., List, J.A. and De Zeeuw, A., 2005. The effect of varying the 
causes of environmental problems on stated WTP values: evidence from a 
field study. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 49: 330-
342. 
Carlsson, F. and Johansson-Stenman, O., 2000. Willingness to pay for improved air 
quality in Sweden. Applied Economics, 32: 661-669. 
Carson, R.T. and Mitchell, R.C., 1995. Sequencing and nesting in contingent 
valuation surveys. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 28: 
155-173.  
Chang, E.C.C. and Chu, Y., 2006. Corruption and trust: Exceptionalism in Asian 
democracies? Journal of Politics, 68: 259-271.  
Danielson, L., Hoban, T.J., Van Houtven, G. and Whitehead, J.C., 1995. Measuring 
the benefits of local public goods: environmental quality in Gaston County, 
North Carolina. Applied Economics, 27: 1253-1260. 




Diener, E. and Suh, E.M., 2000. Culture and Subjective Well-Being. The MIT Press, 
Cambridge.  
Dobbs, I., 1991. Litter and Waste Management: Disposal Taxes versus User 
Charges, Canadian Journal of Economics, 24: 221-227. 
Dupont, D.P., 2004. Do children matter? An examination of gender differences in 
environmental valuation. Ecological Economics, 49: 273-286. 
Engel, U. and Pötschke, M., 1998. Willingness to pay for the environment: social 
structure, value orientations and environmental behaviour in a multilevel 
perspective. Innovation, 11(3): 315-332. 
European Values, 1999. Questionnaire, Tilburg University, The Netherlands. 
Falk, A. and Fehr, E., 2002. Psychological foundations of incentives. European 
Economic Review 46: 687-724. 
Falk, A., Fischbacher, U. and Gächter, S., 2003. Living in two neighbourhoods – 
Social interaction in the lab. CESifo Working Paper No. 954, May 2003, 
Munich. 
Fischbacher, U. and Gächter, S., 2006. Heterogeneous social preferences and the 
dynamics of free riding in public goods. CeDEx Discussion Paper No. 2006-01. 
Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, Nottingham.  
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S. and Fehr E., 2001. Are people conditionally 
cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economics Letters 71: 
397-404. 
Frey, B.S. and Meier, S., 2004a. Pro-social behaviour in a natural setting. Journal of 
Economic Behaviour and Organization 54: 65-88.   
 
 
Frey, B.S. and Meier, S., 2004b. Social comparisons and pro-social behaviour. 
Testing ‘conditional cooperation’ in a field experiment, American Economic 
Review 94: 1717-1722.  
Frey, B.S. and Stutzer, A., 2006. Environmental Morale and Motivation, CREMA 
Working Paper No. 2006-17, Basel.  
Fullerton, D. and Wolverton, A., 2000. Two Generalizations of a Deposit-Refund 
System, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, NBER Working Papers: 
7505, USA. 
Gächter, S., 2006. Conditional cooperation: Behavioural regularities from the lab 
and the field and their policy implications, unpublished manuscript, University 
of Nottingham.  
Heldt, T., 2005. Conditional Cooperation in the Field: Cross-Country Skiers? 
Behaviour in Sweden, unpublished manuscript, Uppsala University. 
Henrich, J. 2004. Cultural group selection, co evolutionary processes and large-
scale cooperation. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 53: 3-35. 
Hidano, N., Kato, T. and Aritomi, M., 2005. Benefits of participating in contingent 
valuation mail surveys and their effects on respondent behaviour: a panel 
analysis. Ecological Economics 52: 63-80. 
Kinnaman, T. and Fullerton, D., 1994. How a fee per-unit garbage affects recycling 
in a model with heterogeneous households, in Public Economics and the 
Environment in an Imperfect World, eds. Bovenberg, A.L. and Crossen, S.; 
Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers: 135-159.  
Ledyard, J., 1995. Public goods: A survey of experimental results. In: Kagel, John 
H., Roth and Alvin E. (Eds.), The Handbook of Experimental Economics. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton: 111-194.  
 
 
Martin, R. and Randal, J., 2005. Voluntary contribution to a public good: a natural 
field experiment, unpublished manuscript, Victoria University of Wellington, 
Wellington. 
Ochs, J. and Roth, A.E., 1989. An experimental study of sequential bargaining. 
American Economic Review, 79: 355-384. 
Polinsky, M.A. and Shavell, S., 2000. The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of 
Law. Journal of Economic Literature 38: 45-76. 
Popp, D., 2001. Altruism and the demand for environmental quality. Land 
Economics, 77: 339-349. 
Rabin, Matthew, 1998. Psychology and economics. Journal of Economic Literature, 
36: 11-46. 
Rege, M. and Telle K., 2001. An Experimental Investigation of Social Norms, 
Discussion papers No. 310, Statistics Norway, Research Department, October 
2001.  
Roth, Alvin E., 1995. Bargaining experiments. In: Kagel, John H. and Roth, Alvin E. 
(Eds.), The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton: 253-342. 
Shang, Jen and Croson, Rachel, 2005. Field experiment in charitable contribution: 
The impact of social influence on the voluntary provision of public goods, 
unpublished manuscript, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. 
Stevens, T.H., More, T.A. and Glass, R.J., 1994. Interpretation and temporal 
stability of CV bids for wildlife existence: a panel study. Land Economics, 70: 
355-363. 
Tisdell, C., and Wilson, C., 2001. Wildlife-based tourism and increased support for 
nature conservation financially and otherwise: evidence from sea turtle 
ecotourism at Mon Repos, Tourism Economics, 7: 233-249.  
 
 
Tittle, C., 1980. Sanctions and Social Deviance: The Question of Deterrence. 
Praeger, New York. 
Torgler, B., 2003. Tax morale in transition countries. Post-Communist Economies, 
15: 357-381. 
Torgler, B., 2006. The importance of faith: Tax morale and religiosity. Journal of 
Economic Behaviour and Organization 61: 81-109. 
Torgler, B., 2007. Tax Compliance and Tax Morale: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Torgler, B. and Garcia-Valiñas Maria A., 2007. The Determinants of Individuals’ 
Attitudes Towards Preventing Environmental Damage, forthcoming in: 
Ecological Economics. 
Uslaner, E.M., 2004. Trust and corruption, in: Lambsdorf, Johann Graf, Taube, 
Markus and Schramm, Matthias (Eds.), Corruption and the New Institutional 
Economics. Routledge: London: 76-92.  
Vesterlund, L., 2003. The informational value of sequential fundraising. Journal of 
Public Economics, 87: 627-657. 
Veisten, K., Hoen, H.F., Navrud, S. and Strand, J., 2004. Scope insensitivity in 
contingent valuation of complex environmental amenities. Journal of 
Environmental Management, 73: 317-331. 
Whitehead, J.C., 1991. Environmental interest group behaviour and self-selection 
bias in contingent valuation mail surveys. Growth and Change, 22: 10-21. 
Witzke, H.P. and Urfei, G., 2001. Willingness to pay for environmental protection in 




Zelezny, L.C., Chua, P.P. and Aldrich, C., 2000. Elaborating on gender differences in 




ENVIRONMENTAL AND CONDITIONAL COOPERATION 
 
   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg. 
Effects 
Coeff. z-Stat.  Marg. 
Effects 
Coeff. t-Stat. 





INDEX ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES 
Robust standard errors  Robust standard errors  Robust standard 
errors 
DEPENDENT V. 
(1) (2)  (3) 
PERCEIVED ENVIRON. 
COOPERATION 
-0.065*** -6.19 -0.023  -0.015*  -1.71  -0.002  -0.010*  -1.66 
INTERESTED IN OTHERS  0.010***  9.04  0.003  0.020***  21.74  0.002  0.142***  21.85 
Voluntary Organization                
ENVIRON. ORGANIZATION  0.114***  3.16  0.040  0.540***  18.94  0.093  0.108***  19.53 
Demographic Factors                
AGE 30-39  0.099***  3.59  0.035  -0.045**  -2  -0.005  -0.018**  -2.17 
AGE 40-49  0.159***  5.41  0.056  -0.075***  -3.09  -0.009  -0.029***  -3.32 
AGE 50-59  0.219***  6.8  0.075  -0.119***  -4.54  -0.014  -0.042***  -4.8 
AGE 60-69  0.269***  6.74  0.091  -0.119***  -3.64  -0.013  -0.039***  -3.84 
AGE 70+  0.237***  5.01  0.080  -0.184***  -4.76  -0.020  -0.050***  -5.01 
WOMAN 0.089***  5.03  0.032  0.046***  3.2  0.006  0.021***  3.21 
Formal and Informal Educ.                
EDUCATION -0.001  -0.67  0.000  0.023***  17.02  0.003  0.106***  17.42 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION  -0.036***  -2.84  -0.013  0.150***  13.86  0.018  0.091***  14.02 
Marital Status                
WIDOWED -0.037  -1.09  -0.013  -0.106***  -3.82  -0.012  -0.026***  -3.77 
DIVORCED -0.083***  -2.65  -0.030  -0.064**  -2.37  -0.007  -0.015**  -2.45 
SEPARATED -0.102  -1.64  -0.037  -0.019  -0.36  -0.002  -0.002  -0.4 
NEVER MARRIED  -0.113***  -4.55  -0.041  -0.048**  -2.31  -0.006  -0.019**  -2.37 
Employment Status                
PART TIME EMPLOYEE  -0.128***  -3.95  -0.047  0.032  1.21  0.004  0.007  1.16 
SELFEMPLOYED 0.048  1.36  0.017  0.069**  2.54  0.009  0.015**  2.57 
UNEMPLOYED 0.106***  3.18  0.037  -0.100***  -3.66  -0.012  -0.039***  -3.83 
AT HOME  0.176***  5.34  0.060  -0.015  -0.59  -0.002  -0.005  -0.71 
STUDENT -0.158***  -3.89  -0.058  0.091***  2.8  0.012  0.018***  2.74 
RETIRED 0.010  0.33  0.004  -0.134***  -4.87  -0.015  -0.034***  -5.12 
OTHER 0.091  1.44  0.032  0.011  0.21  0.001  0.001  0.13 
Religiosity                
CHURCH ATTENDANCE  0.010***  3.01  0.004  0.011***  4  0.001  0.028***  4.59 
REGIONS  YES        YES        YES    
Pseudo R2  0.024       0.026       0.086    
Number of observations  32433       30691       30691    
Prob > chi2 / Prob > F  0.000        0.000        0.000    
Notes: The reference group consists of AGE<30, MAN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, 












FURTHER SPECIFICATION INCLUDING THE ECONOMIC SITUATION 
 




Coeff. z-Stat.  Marg. 
Effects 
Coeff. t-Stat. 





INDEX ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES 
  
Robust standard errors  Robust standard errors  Robust standard 
errors 
DEPENDENT V. 
(4) (5)  (6) 
PERCEIVED ENVIRON. 
COOPERATION 
-0.044*** -2.96 -0.016  -0.028**  -2.32  -0.003  -0.020**  -2.35 
INTERESTED IN OTHERS  0.006***  4.30  0.002  0.021***  16.01  0.002  0.148***  16.32 
Voluntary Organization               
ENVIRON. ORGANIZATION  0.099*  1.82  0.035  0.498***  11.37  0.079  0.093***  11.65 
Demographic Factors               
AGE 30-39  0.082**  2.14  0.029  -0.080**  -2.58  -0.009  -0.033***  -2.81 
AGE 40-49  0.145***  3.47  0.050  -0.114***  -3.41  -0.012  -0.045***  -3.70 
AGE 50-59  0.199***  4.45  0.069  -0.133***  -3.67  -0.014  -0.048***  -3.99 
AGE 60-69  0.166***  3.00  0.057  -0.124***  -2.78  -0.013  -0.042***  -3.02 
AGE 70+  0.033  0.51  0.012  -0.163***  -3.13  -0.017  -0.046***  -3.42 
WOMAN  0.029 1.15  0.010  0.004  0.19  0.000  0.002 0.21 
Formal and Informal Educ.               
EDUCATION -0.006**  -2.27  -0.002  0.024***  10.60  0.003  0.101***  10.85 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION  -0.038  -1.04  -0.014  0.205***  6.96  0.026  0.065***  6.93 
Income               
UPPER CLASS  -0.115***  -4.36  -0.041  0.084***  4.01  0.010  0.037***  4.11 
MIDDLE CLASS  -0.041**  -2.29  -0.015  0.110***  7.20  0.012  0.067***  7.36 
Marital Status               
WIDOWED  -0.009 -0.19  -0.003  -0.053  -1.36  -0.006  -0.012 -1.33 
DIVORCED  -0.149*** -3.12 -0.055  -0.115***  -2.69  -0.012  -0.025*** -2.82 
SEPARATED -0.168*  -1.87  -0.062  0.038  0.49  0.004  0.004  0.45 
NEVER MARRIED  -0.077**  -2.19  -0.028  -0.076**  -2.59  -0.008  -0.030***  -2.71 
Employment Status               
PART TIME EMPLOYEE  -0.050  -1.01  -0.018  0.035  0.89  0.004  0.008  0.86 
SELFEMPLOYED  0.112** 2.28  0.039  0.074**  2.03  0.009 0.017** 2.13 
UNEMPLOYED 0.196***  4.31  0.068  -0.080**  -2.18  -0.009  -0.032**  -2.32 
AT HOME  0.252***  5.72  0.086  0.073**  2.12  0.009  0.021**  2.08 
STUDENT -0.124**  -2.06  -0.045  0.054  1.15  0.006  0.011  1.22 
RETIRED -0.014  -0.29  -0.005  -0.095**  -2.32  -0.010  -0.023**  -2.50 
OTHER 0.049  0.58  0.017  -0.025  -0.40  -0.003  -0.004  -0.46 
Religiosity               
CHURCH  ATTENDANCE  0.021*** 4.87 0.008  0.015***  4.31  0.002  0.041*** 4.94 
REGIONS  YES        YES        YES    
Pseudo R2  0.023       0.029       0.099  0.023 
Number of observations  16987       16305       16305    
Prob > chi2 / Prob > F  0.000        0.000        0.000    
Notes: The reference group consists of AGE<30, MAN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, LOWEST CLASS, EASTERN EUROPE. 











 Coeff.  t-Stat.  Coeff.  t-Stat.  Coeff. t-Stat.  Coeff. t-Stat. 
   WEIGHTED 2SLS  FIRST STAGE 
REGRESSION 
WEIGHTED 2SLS  FIRST STAGE 
REGRESSION 
DEPENDENT V.  ENVIRONMENTAL MORALE 
(7) 




-0.022*** -2.74      -0.028***  -3.28    
INTERESTED IN OTHERS  0.003***  8.77  0.001**  2.42  0.008***  17.91  0.001**  2.54 
Voluntary Organization              
ENVIRON. 
ORGANIZATION 
0.038*** 3.05  -0.065*** -3.74  0.196***  14.58  -0.065*** -3.68 
Demographic Factors              
AGE  30-39  0.031*** 2.97  -0.061*** -4.58  -0.012  -1.08  -0.067*** -4.91 
AGE  40-49  0.057*** 5.08  -0.059*** -4.10  -0.017  -1.45  -0.059*** -4.02 
AGE  50-59  0.073*** 6.16  -0.042*** -2.71  -0.031**  -2.47  -0.043*** -2.68 
AGE  60-69  0.090*** 6.38  -0.073*** -3.76  -0.030*  -1.90  -0.078*** -3.92 
AGE  70+  0.073*** 4.35  -0.082*** -3.60  -0.050*** -2.72  -0.084*** -3.56 
WOMAN 0.033***  5.03  0.049***  5.71  0.018**  2.54  0.046***  5.26 
Formal and Informal Educ.              
EDUCATION -0.001  -1.16  0.001  0.88  0.008***  11.80  0.001  1.04 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION  -0.012**  -2.52  -0.022***  -3.44  0.051***  10.05  -0.023***  -3.52 
Marital Status              
WIDOWED -0.015  -1.26  -0.008  -0.51  -0.036***  -2.77  -0.010  -0.61 
DIVORCED -0.035***  -2.96  0.010  0.64  -0.027**  -2.16  0.014  0.84 
SEPARATED -0.033  -1.46  0.055*  1.78  0.014  0.55  0.062*  1.94 
NEVER MARRIED  -0.045***  -4.77  0.023*  1.91  -0.023**  -2.40  0.023*  1.82 
Employment Status              
PART TIME EMPLOYEE  -0.043***  -3.44  0.012  0.76  0.002  0.17  0.008  0.48 
SELFEMPLOYED  0.020  1.52  0.020 1.19  0.011 0.84  0.011 0.65 
UNEMPLOYED 0.044***  3.91  0.034**  2.16  -0.036***  -2.77  0.030*  1.81 
AT HOME  0.057***  5.05  0.035**  2.29  0.003  0.25  0.028*  1.79 
STUDENT  -0.063***  -3.84 0.062*** 3.16  0.055*** 3.29  0.064*** 3.14 
RETIRED 0.002  0.16  0.000  -0.01  -0.044***  -3.48  0.000  0.01 
OTHER 0.039*  1.74  -0.019  -0.67  0.001  0.02  -0.004  -0.12 
Religiosity              
CHURCH ATTENDANCE  0.004***  3.26  0.007***  4.25  0.001  1.07  0.007***  4.24 
REGIONS  YES     YES     YES      YES 
Instruments                
Interest in friends      0.021***  3.49      0.023***  3.81 
Index perceived honesty      0.323***  96.18      0.323***  93.87 
Children     0.073***  4.87      0.082***  5.27 
Test of excluded instruments      0.000         0.000   
Centred R2  0.031         0.051       
Number of observations  29733         28349       
Prob > F  0.000           0.000          
Notes: The reference group consists of AGE<30, MAN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, 









FILTERED PERCEIVED ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 
   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg. 
Effects 
Coeff. z-Stat.  Marg. 
Effects
Coeff. z-Stat.  Marg. 
Effects 






INDEX ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES 
Robust standard errors  Robust standard errors  Robust standard errors 
DEPENDENT V. 




-0.043***  -4.10  -0.015 -0.009  -1.05  -0.001 -0.022*  -1.81  -0.002 
INTERESTED IN OTHERS  0.010***  9.05  0.003  0.020***  21.74  0.002  0.021***  16.03  0.002 
Voluntary Organization               
Environ.  Organization  0.116***  3.21  0.040 0.541*** 18.96 0.093 0.498*** 11.37 0.079 
Demographic Factors               
AGE  30-39  0.101***  3.67  0.036 -0.044** -1.97 -0.005  -0.080** -2.57 -0.009 
AGE  40-49  0.162***  5.50  0.056 -0.074***  -3.06 -0.009  -0.114***  -3.40 -0.012 
AGE  50-59  0.222***  6.90  0.076 -0.118***  -4.51 -0.013  -0.132***  -3.65 -0.014 
AGE  60-69  0.274***  6.85  0.093 -0.118***  -3.60 -0.013  -0.123***  -2.76 -0.013 
AGE  70+  0.242***  5.12  0.082 -0.183***  -4.73 -0.020  -0.162***  -3.12 -0.016 
WOMAN  0.088***  5.00  0.032 0.045*** 3.19  0.006 0.004  0.18  0.000 
Formal and Informal Educ.               
EDUCATION  -0.001  -0.67  0.000 0.023*** 17.01 0.003 0.024*** 10.60 0.003 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION  -0.036***  -2.81  -0.013  0.150***  13.87  0.018  0.110***  7.20  0.012 
Income               
UPPER  CLASS           0.206***  6.96  0.026 
MIDDLE  CLASS           0.084***  4.01  0.010 
Marital Status               
WIDOWED  -0.037  -1.08  -0.013 -0.106*** -3.82  -0.012 -0.053  -1.35  -0.006 
DIVORCED -0.083***  -2.65  -0.030  -0.064** -2.37 -0.007  -0.115***  -2.69 -0.012 
SEPARATED  -0.102*  -1.65  -0.037 -0.019  -0.36  -0.002 0.038  0.48  0.004 
NEVER MARRIED  -0.113***  -4.58  -0.041  -0.048** -2.32 -0.006  -0.076** -2.59 -0.008 
Employment Status               
PART TIME EMPLOYEE  -0.128***  -3.96  -0.047  0.032  1.20  0.004  0.035  0.88  0.004 
SELFEMPLOYED  0.048  1.34  0.017 0.069**  2.53  0.009 0.074**  2.03  0.009 
UNEMPLOYED  0.104***  3.14  0.037 -0.100***  -3.67 -0.012  -0.081** -2.18 -0.009 
AT HOME  0.175***  5.33  0.060  -0.015  -0.59  -0.002  0.073**  2.11  0.009 
STUDENT  -0.159***  -3.92  -0.059  0.090***  2.79 0.012  0.053  1.14 0.006 
RETIRED  0.011  0.36  0.004 -0.134***  -4.86 -0.015  -0.095** -2.32 -0.010 
OTHER  0.092  1.45  0.032 0.011  0.21  0.001 -0.026  -0.40 -0.003 
Religiosity               
CHURCH  ATTENDANCE 0.010***  2.97  0.004 0.011*** 3.98  0.001 0.015*** 4.30  0.002 
REGIONS  YES        YES        YES       
Pseudo R2  0.023       0.026       0.051      
Number of observations  32433       30691       16305      
Prob > chi2   0.000        0.000        0.000       
Notes: The reference group consists of AGE<30, MAN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, LOWEST CLASS, EASTERN EUROPE. 










Table A1 - Countries 
Western European Countries  Eastern European Countries 
Germany   Belarus 
Austria Bulgaria 
Belgium Croatia 
Denmark Czech  Republic 
Finland Estonia 
France Greece 













VARIABLES Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
ENVIRONMENTAL MORALE  40674  0.683  0.465  0  1 
INDEX ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES  38071  3.034  1.598  0  6 
PERCEIVED ENVIRONMENTAL 
COOPERATION 37437  2.710  0.777  1  4 
INTERESTED IN OTHERS  38473 2.635  1.167  1  5 
INDEX CONCERN FOR THE SOCIETY  38540 34.864  7.727  11 55 
ENVIRON. ORGANIZATION  41125 0.049  0.216  0  1 
AGE 30-39  40963 0.197  0.398  0  1 
AGE 40-49  40963 0.191  0.393  0  1 
AGE 50-59  40963 0.150  0.357  0  1 
AGE 60-69  40963 0.135  0.342  0  1 
AGE 70+  40963 0.102  0.302  0  1 
WOMAN  41114 0.540  0.498  0  1 
EDUCATION 39840  18.712  5.125  5  74 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION  40713 1.886  0.654  1  3 
UPPER CLASS  21335  0.136  0.343  0  1 
MIDDLE CLASS  21335  0.338  0.473  0  1 
WIDOWED  39861 0.097  0.295  0  1 
DIVORCED  39861 0.070  0.256  0  1 
SEPARATED  39861 0.016  0.124  0  1 
NEVER MARRIED  39861 0.228  0.420  0  1 
PART TIME EMPLOYEE  40919 0.068  0.252  0  1 
SELFEMPLOYED  40919 0.052  0.222  0  1 
UNEMPLOYED  40919 0.229  0.420  0  1 
AT HOME  40919 0.095  0.293  0  1 
STUDENT  40919 0.061  0.240  0  1 
RETIRED  40919 0.073  0.261  0  1 
OTHER  40919 0.018  0.131  0  1 
CHURCH ATTENDANCE  40762 3.871  2.456  1  8 
INSTRUMENTS          
INTEREST IN FRIENDS  40885 3.289  0.690  1  4 
INDEX PERCEIVED HONESTY  34478 5.429  1.162  2  8 
CHILDREN  41125 0.077  0.266  0  1 
 